World trade law and a framework convention on alcohol control by Baumberg Geiger, Ben
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copy edited version of an article published in the Journal of 
Epidemiology and Community Health. The definitive publisher-authenticated version of 
World Trade Law and a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control [peer-reviewed 
editorial] (Baumberg 2010). Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 64:473-
4   
is available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jech.2008.084855  
 
 
JECH/2008/084855 – World Trade Law and a Framework 




Institute of Alcohol Studies, London UK 
 
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE), London School of Economics, London UK 
 
Postal address:  
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE), 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Houghton Street,  
London WC2A 2AE 
 
Telephone: +44 7920 843296 
Email: b.p.baumberg@lse.ac.uk  
 
Keywords: Alcohol Drinking, Legal Aspects, Public Policy [MeSH], economics [MeSH 
subheading] 
 





Spurred by the creation of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), there 
have been increasing calls for the adoption of a similar agreement for alcohol, usually 
termed a ‘Framework Convention on Alcohol Control’ (FCAC).  The American Public Health 
Association and Indian Government have both explicitly called for such a convention, as 
have editorials and articles in leading medical journals.[1]  Furthermore, the World Medical 
Association has been broadly positive, as has the WHO Commission on Social Determinants 
of Health. 
 
Why are these influential groups calling for such a convention?  On one level it is because 
alcohol is both a major public health and social welfare problem, accounting for 3.8% of 
global mortality and 4.6% of the global burden of disease [2] as well as around $210-665bn 
of social costs.[3]  But beyond this, there is a need to show how an FCAC could help, and 
leading supporters cite three main arguments. [4, 5] 
 
Firstly, an FCAC could combat the treatment of alcohol as an ‘ordinary commodity’ in world 
trade law such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements, which advocates claim 
interfere with nation states’ ability to reduce harm.  An FCAC is unlikely to simply over-rule 
previous trade agreements; the ‘last in time’ rule may be commonplace in domestic law but 
the WTO parties are unlikely to accept this challenge to its authority – indeed, this could lead 
to the breakdown of the entire world trade law system – and instead the WTO is likely to use 
its powerful enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance.[6]  Nevertheless, the 
convention could help defend alcohol policies in trade courts by showing an international 
community of support for effective policies addressing alcohol-related threats to human life.  
Furthermore, the confidence and information exchange of an FCAC could help countries 
avoid rejecting effective policies in the false belief that they are prohibited by the WTO, and 
may even contribute to a greater WHO role in future trade negotiations.   
 
Secondly, an FCAC would help countries deal with alcohol issues that transcend borders in 
a globalised world.  For example, liberalisation of media products can make it difficult for one 
country to restrict access to alcohol marketing that occurs on channels based elsewhere.  
Similarly, the combination of ever-easier travel, high alcohol taxes in some countries and 
trade liberalisation has increased the potential for both smuggling and legal cross-border 
purchases of alcohol, undercutting the ability of nation states to fully control their own alcohol 
policies.[7] 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an FCAC could counterbalance the forces that 
threaten to increase global alcohol-related harm [1] – forces that have been described as a 
‘perfect storm’ for developing countries.[8]  Policies purely motivated by health are likely to 
be maintained if challenged at the WTO, but protectionist policies like tariffs will not, leading 
to demonstrable increases in harm and consumption.[9] Simultaneously, rising incomes 
make alcohol more affordable to ever-increasing numbers of people.  And in a climate where 
high-income countries as a whole tend to show high but stable consumption, the alcohol 
industry has been pushing for growth in middle- and low-income countries that often lack 
effective regulation.[4] 
 
Against this tide, an FCAC could encourage nation states to implement effective alcohol 
policies, and could also have more indirect impacts such as helping global NGO 
movements.[4]  Indeed, it seems likely that even the public debate about the FCAC could 
lead to decreases in harm before any policies were implemented.[5]  A convention may also 
prompt more technical assistance to low- and middle-income countries, particularly given 
that the global alcohol industry has been promoting industry-friendly draft strategies in some 
African countries.[10]  
 
It therefore seems clear that an FCAC would help reduce the significant health and social 
burden of alcohol – yet politically it seems that there is simply too little support for it to be 
implemented at the present time.  It was discussed by the WHO Executive Board in 2005 but 
while there was some support  there was also vociferous opposition.[11]   Of itself this 
should not deter action; if anything it shows the need for health professionals to lend their 
political support.  However, it reflects the wider problem that there is little public enthusiasm 
for effective policies in many countries, partly due to the dominance of discourses around 
individual responsibility and partly due to a lack of understanding of ‘what works’ [12] – 
explanations that themselves reflect successful campaigns by political opponents. 
 
To achieve an FCAC, then, reducing global alcohol-related harm requires a global 
movement that persuades sceptical publics that easy policies are rarely effective, and that 
there may be better balances between the pleasure from alcohol and the harms that result.  
Moreover, such a global movement may realise in the short-term at least some of the gains 
that an FCAC could more fully deliver in the long-term: greater international support and 
technical assistance, improved confidence in the face of trade law, and collaborations 
between countries.[4]  The WHO has already made tentative steps in this direction, with 
Member States in 2008 calling for the Secretariat to develop a global strategy on alcohol.  
Yet the outcome of this process in 2009 is far from a foregone conclusion.  In this situation, 
health professionals who are silent risk their opinions being sidelined.  Those believing in the 
need for global action can only ensure this is recognised by mobilising whatever networks 
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